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Abstract. 
Shaped by structural forces of change, banking in emerging markets has recently experienced a 
decline in its traditional activities, leading banks to diversify into new business strategies. This 
paper examines whether the observed shift into non-interest based activities improves financial 
performance. Using a sample of 714 banks across 14 East-Asian and Latin-American countries over 
the post 1997-crisis changing structure, we find that diversification gains are more than offset by the 
cost of increased exposure to the non-interest income, specifically by the trading income volatility. 
But this diversification performance’s effect is found to be no linear with risk, and significantly not 
uniform among banks and across business lines. An implication of these findings is that banking 
institutions can reap diversification benefits as long as they well-studied it depending on their 
specific characteristics, competences and risk levels, and as they choose the right niche. 
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1. Introduction 
The 1997 financial crisis in emerging market economies has important implications for the 
feasibility of different banking models. The crisis has clearly exposed the dangers of a bank’s 
excessive reliance on the traditional business activities in a context of capital account liberalization. 
Many analysts have particularly advanced the lack of proper diversification of the loan portfolio as 
a key catalyst of bank distress after financial deregulation (Stone, 2000; Radelet and Sachs, 1999). 
Over time, the structure of emerging countries banking markets has been shaped by policies that 
encourage the provision of financial services to specific sectors of economies on the fringe of 
economic development. After the crisis, the universal banking model, which allows banks to 
combine a wide range of financial activities, including commercial banking, investment banking 
and insurance, has emerged as a desirable structure for a financial institution from the viewpoint of 
policymakers. While most banking systems not surprisingly still rely mainly on income from 
traditional banking, the post-crisis years have seen an increasing number of banks especially in 
East-Asia and Latin-America moving into investment banking-type activities, fee-based business 
and related activities (Laeven, 2007). The shifts have been leading to a blurring of lines across 
different financial institutions and have been facilitated by relatively liberal laws as regards banking 
and securities business. 
Conventional industry wisdom predicts that combining different types of activities –non-interest 
earning and interest-earning assets– and rebalancing bank income away from interest income and 
toward non-interest activities may increase return and diversify risks, therefore boosting 
performance. Empiric’s studies tend, however, to contradict these conventional industry beliefs. 
Research provides conflicting conclusions about a bank’s benefits of optimal asset or activity mix. 
In general, these studies provide only little evidence of diversification benefits. In an early survey, 
Saunders and Walters (1994) review 18 studies that examine whether non-bank activities reduce 
bank holding company risk and indicate no consensus: 9 answer yes, 6 answer no, and 3 are mixed.  
Few earlier studies find some potential for gain from expansion into specific activities. Boyd et 
al. (1980), Kwast (1989), Templeton and Severiens (1992), and Gallo et al. (1996) examined   
combination of US bank and non-bank activities, and find a slight potential for risk reduction at 
relatively low levels of non-bank activities. Conversely, significant strand of literature related to the 
performance and diversification of US banks draw a general conclusion that bank expansion into 
less traditional financial activities is associated with increased risk and/or lower returns. Demsetz 
and Strahan (1997) show that better diversification does not translate into reductions in overall risk. 
Kwan (1998) finds that Section 20 subsidiaries are typically more risky but not necessarily more 
profitable than their commercial bank affiliates. DeYoung and Roland (2001) look at the impact of 
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fee-based activities for 472 large US commercial banks, and conclude to an increase in the volatility 
of bank revenue and the existence of a risk premium associated with these activities.  
Studies that followed generated similar findings. Stiroh (2002, 2006) shows that greater reliance 
on non-interest income has been associated with higher volatility of bank income and higher risk, 
but not higher returns. Hirtle and Stiroh (2007) find that the increased focus of US banks on retail 
banking was associated with significantly lower equity and accounting returns for all banks. This 
result is consistent with evidence provided by the several studies of DeYoung and Rice (2004a,b,c). 
Increases in non-interest income at US banking companies are associated with higher, but more 
volatile, rates of return, resulting in reduced risk-adjusted returns. More relevant recent research 
(Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Goddard et al. 2007) based even on US data suggests that expansion into 
non-traditional activities is associated with more volatile revenue streams that can offset the risk-
spreading benefits of diversification. It concludes that the direct exposure effect reflecting the 
impact of non-interest income dominates an indirect exposure effect related to diversification. 
A less uniform pessimistic picture emerges from studies for countries other than the US. A study 
of loan portfolio diversity by Acharya et al. (2006) reports that diversification of bank assets is not 
guaranteed to produce superior performance and/or greater safety for banks for a sample of 105 
Italian banks. An empirical analysis of Mercieca et al. (2007) focused on a sample of 755 small 
banks for 15 European countries find no direct diversification benefits within or across business 
lines, but an inverse association between non-interest income and bank performance. From 15 
European Union countries, Smith et al. (2003) find that non-interest income is less stable than 
interest income for a sample of banks. Based on a set of 734 European banks, Lepetit et al. (2007) 
show that banks expanding into non-interest income activities, presented higher risk and higher 
insolvency risk than banks which mainly supplied loans. Results based on large international 
sample of banks are more conflicting. Laeven and Levine (2007) examined the effects of 
diversification on the market value of large banks from 42 countries, and find that the market values 
of diversified banks were lower than those of their specialized counterparts. Demirguç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2009) investigates the implications of banks activity and short-term funding strategies for 
bank risk and returns using a sample of 1334 banks in 101 countries. They conclude that universal 
banking can be beneficial in terms of diversifying risks and increasing returns, but banking 
strategies that rely predominantly on generating non-interest income or attracting non-deposit 
funding are very risky.  
Most of the studies on the benefits of banks engaging in a broader scope of activities have 
focused on the large, complex banking institutions that dominate US banking and relatively little is 
known about potential diversification benefits for banks in emerging market economies. This is an 
important issue because these banks play a critical role in the stability of the global financial 
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system. Should emerging countries banks be diversified or focused on a few related fields? Does 
diversification indeed lead to enhanced performance and, therefore, greater safety for these banks, 
as traditional portfolio and banking theory would suggest? This paper proposes to investigate this 
relationship between bank performance and revenue diversification in the changing structure of the 
emerging economies banking industry during the post-crisis decade. Based on a broad set of 714 
banks across 14 East-Asian and Latin-American countries for the period 1997- end 2007, our study 
documents the dramatic increase in non-interest income at emerging economies banks during the 
last decade that reflects diversification of banks into non-traditional activities, and examines the 
implications of these changes for the financial performance of banks as measured by their risk-
adjusted outcomes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the main 
changes shaping the banking industry in the emerging market economies. Section 3 reviews the 
theoretical literature on diversification, and develops our hypothesis. In section 4, we focus on 
stylized facts of two different Latin American and Asian economies –Argentina and Korea– to 
examine the recent evolving to diversification in emerging market banks. Section 5 specifies the 
variables and describes the data. We present the empirical results in section 6, and offer concluding 
remarks in section 7. 
 
2. The changes in emerging market banking industry  
Banking systems in emerging economies have undergone substantial changes in the last few 
decades. During recent period, banking industry faces a shrinking of the portion of intermediated 
funds handled by banks and a decline in traditional intermediation activities, leading bank 
institutions to move into new business strategies as investment banking-type and related fee-
generating activities. At least four forces underline this bank shift into non-traditional activities: 
domestic deregulation, technology innovations, changes in corporate behavior and banking crises. 
 
2.1. Deregulation and opening-up to foreign competition 
Banking in the emerging economies was traditionally a highly protected industry, living off good 
spreads achieved on regulated deposit and lending rates and pervasive restrictions on domestic and 
foreign entry. Global market, technology developments and macroeconomic pressures have forced 
the banking industry and the regulators to change the old way of doing business, and to deregulate 
the banking industry at the national level and open up financial markets to foreign competition. As a 
result, borders between financial products, banks and non-bank financial institutions and the 
geographical locations of financial institutions have started to break down. These changes have 
significantly increased competitive pressures on banks in the emerging economies and have led to 
deep changes in the banking strategies.  
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One of the main catalysts for increased competition at the domestic level has been the removal of 
ceilings on deposit rates and the lifting of prohibitions on interest payments on current accounts. 
These deregulation measures have reduced sources of cheap funding for many banks and put 
pressure on their traditional intermediation profits. Banks reacted to this margins compression and 
market power decline by raising their involvement in new activities and diversifying their activities 
which considerably altered their income structure by reducing the importance of their traditional 
lines of business. Banks also increasingly face competition from the non-bank financial institutions, 
especially for lending to large companies. They are thus constrained to expand their product lines 
and to offer financial products and services that had previously been reserved for other financial 
institutions. In addition, savers place now a larger share of their savings in other financial 
institutions like mutual funds and pension funds. Since, many banks cannot acquire all the core 
deposits they want, they engage in liability management by borrowing in the money market. At the 
margin, this change in bank liability structure could affect its allocation of resources between 
traditional and non-traditional activities by producing a larger quantity of non-traditional activities 
concurrently with finding other sources of funds1. Intensified competition has also made it harder 
for banks to cross-subsidize different activities and has forced them to price risks more realistically 
and to charge explicitly for previously free services. Accompanying deregulation has been greater 
emphasis on capital adequacy, which has encouraged banks to securitize some assets and generate 
more fee-based income.  
 
2.2. Technology innovation 
New information technology is not at present likely to impinge much on the development of the 
banking industry in the emerging economies, which remain technologically behind the industrial 
countries2. However, banks are required to exploit the new technologies, which can fundamentally 
change banking business models. The major issue about new information technology is its impact 
on the processing of information, which is the very essence of the banking business, and the 
emergence of entirely new financial instruments and production processes. Banks are required to 
innovate in services and products, especially new deposit and loan-based offerings, to differentiate 
strategies and to combine different activities to set themselves apart from rivals. They would need 
to fundamentally transform its business into a much wider array of non-traditional services. The 
rising importance of off-balance sheet activities, ranging from credit lines to derivatives products, is 
symptomatic of this development. In this new technological environment, loans to small and 
                                                          
1
 Unlike, traditional loans, certain non-traditional activities allow banks to provide services without having to obtain 
balance sheet funding. 
2
 For example, the low level of penetration in most emerging economies means that the internet is not seen as a threat to 
traditional banks. Given the signs of a possible bursting of the e-banking bubble in the United States and Europe, some 
have also argued that the issue of electronic banking may go away before the emerging markets need to worry about it. 
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moderate-sized businesses based on private, information-rich relationships between business people 
and their commercial bankers stand out as one of the last types of loans that are still produced in the 
traditional intermediation fashion.  
 
2.3. Changes in corporate behavior 
The spread of information technology has affected the banking industry both directly, through 
information technology applications in marketing of financial products, and indirectly, through its 
impact on the development of financial markets and corporate behavior. This impact is most clearly 
felt in the case of technology firms, which are more or less forced to turn to capital markets to 
finance their projects because banks are not prepared to deal with the high level of uncertainty 
associated with the development of new technologies. However, disintermediation is not limited to 
new economy firms; it is also beginning to be felt in the more traditional old economy sectors. 
Larger firms have been moving away from commercial bank loans toward open market securities 
like commercial paper or long-term bonds. Bonds outstanding have risen strongly in almost all 
emerging economies over the past few years, allowing many large firms to raise funds by issuing 
securities more cheaply than they can borrow from banks. Banks are under increasing pressure to 
keep their customers, and to the extent that more and more creditworthy firms turn to alternative 
funding sources and the proportion of higher-risk bank customers increases, banks, especially in the 
emerging economies, are forced to develop techniques for better pricing and provisioning of credit 
risks. The increased demand for such risk management services meant that in addition to their 
traditional intermediary role, banks were called upon to provide such services3. This meant that 
banks had to increasingly diversify out of their traditional banking operations and provide fee-based 
services. There were standard contracts for hedging of risks associated with markets. However, 
when corporations desired products tailored to their specific needs, they turned to banks for those 
products. This demand led to a wide variety of custom-tailored contracts such as loan commitments, 
forward contracts and swaps. The growth of off-balance sheet activities was a natural outgrowth of 
banks providing such risk management services. In addition, banks have an incentive to increase 
their presence and role on financial markets by providing both lending and other services for the 
firm, such as underwriting, guarantees, holding equity and engaging in venture capital activities. 
This is further encouraged by the development of financial instruments inducing more investment in 
real assets. Alternatively, the shift to trading-based services could continue, and banks could 
become more involved as asset gatherers and active intermediaries in these markets.   
                                                          
3
 For example, companies that borrowed in their domestic currency, derived income in other currencies from their 
foreign operations and banks could help such companies to control their foreign currency risk. Similarly, technology-
intensive firms for whom unpredictable short-term revenues imposed severe constraints on their research and 
development (R&D) budgets, approached banks that provided products designed to hedge overseas income and plan 
R&D over longer period. 
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2.4. Systemic banking crises in the 1990s 
There were many systemic banking crises in emerging markets during the 1990s, often occurring 
shortly after the financial deregulation. Considerable attention in the financial crisis literature has 
been devoted to macroeconomic and institutional causes of banking crises. In particular, 
unsustainably high growth of lending to the private sector, poor prudential regulations and bank 
supervision, and premature capital account liberalization were identified as major contributing 
factors. However, some of the most common sources of banking crises are microeconomic in 
nature, including the insufficiently diversified loan books that made specialist banks over-dependent 
on the particular region or sector served; excessive optimism about lending to rapidly expanding 
manufacturing firms and speculative property developers; credit assessment by banks often very 
poor, and loans often made to related companies or state-owned enterprises, frequently at the behest 
of governments; management incentives often inappropriate; and the risks from excessive maturity 
and currency mismatches not fully appreciated. The proportion of loans that have become impaired 
during banking crises in the emerging markets has generally been much greater than that in the 
industrial world, implying also higher economic costs, especially in the relatively large bank-based 
financial systems in Asia.  
The post-crisis decade has been marked by a typical change in the bank behavior of emerging 
economies. First, there is often a substantial decline in private sector intermediation that reflects a 
“flight to liquidity”. Banks have restructured their portfolio towards highly liquid public securities, 
cash reserves and disproportionately decrease private sector credit reflecting the strategy chosen to 
minimize risk after systemic distress. Second, there is a decline in bank profitability often linked to 
the high level of non-performing loans on banks’ balance sheets. Banks typically get rid of their 
loans, and find new business lines such as fee-based activities and investment in government 
securities4. From the viewpoint of the regulators and supervisors, the emergence of the universal 
banking model, which allows banks to combine a wide range of financial activities, is a desirable 
structure for bank institutions, implicitly assumed to be part of the stabilization process. Non-
traditional activities are viewed as helping to reduce the risk of bankruptcy since they will be 
diversifying the income generated by the bank, which could have a positive effect on firm value.  
This evolution of emerging economies’ banking underlines the changing nature and structure of 
the banking industry. As banks attempt to compete in the broader and evolving financial-services 
industry, they alter their behavior by changing the menu of products and services they offer. These 
changes can be viewed as part of an overall strategy to expand beyond traditional sources of 
                                                          
4
 For instance, in Brazil recovery of bank profitability was not a result of greater intermediation per se, but of the 
reorientation of banks portfolios towards liquidity, predominantly government securities. 
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revenues, to rely less on scarce core deposits as a source of financing, and to help boosting profits 
and reducing risk exposures. This diversification into non-traditional activities resulting from the 
evolving business of banking rises questions about its potential implications on bank performance 
what motivates this paper. It is also interesting from a policy standpoint to investigate this issue. 
 
3. Theoretical background and hypothesis  
Theory provides conflicting predictions about the impact of greater diversification of activities 
on the performance of financial intermediaries. Existing theories of financial intermediation imply 
increasing returns to scale linked to diversification. As suggested by the work of Diamond (1991), 
Rajan (1992), Saunders and Walter (1994), and Stein (2002), banks acquire customer information 
during the process of making loans that can facilitate the efficient provision of other financial 
services, including the underwriting of securities. Similarly, securities and insurance underwriting, 
brokerage and mutual fund services, and other activities can produce information that improves loan 
making. Thus, banks that engage in a variety of activities could enjoy economies of scope that boost 
performance. 
There is also a cost linked to intermediary risk, and a better diversified intermediary has less risk 
and thus lower costs. In models of insurance or liquidity provision (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; 
Chari and Jagannathan, 1988; Jacklin and Bhattarcharya, 1988; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990), 
investors are risk averse and face some risk which the intermediary can pool and diversify on their 
behalf. Moreover, diversification makes it cheaper for financial institutions to achieve credibility in 
their role as screeners or monitors of borrowers. As shown by the models of delegated investment 
monitoring or evaluation (Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 
1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986), the possibility of bad outcomes allows the intermediary to hide 
proceeds or to claim that bad luck rather than lack of effort led to the bad outcomes; an intermediary 
with better diversified investments has less chance of very bad outcomes, reducing associated costs. 
Thus, that it is optimal for a bank to be maximally diversified across sectors. 
Experts of diversification argue also that lenders such as banks and finance companies are 
typically highly levered, and diversification across sectors reduces their chance of costly financial 
distress. Similarly, the conventional view is that greater competition has increased the need for 
banks to diversify: lower profits leave less margin for error, so diversification provides a necessary 
reduction in risk. Only a simple policy prescription for regulators is suggested by the traditional 
theory: the banking sector should be left relatively unrestricted, which should in turn lead to an 
equilibrium with a few large, well-diversified, and competitive banks. 
The Winton’s models (1997, 1999) results of the proverbial wisdom of “not putting all your eggs 
on one basket” suggest that the opposite can be true. Increased competition may magnify the 
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“Winner’s Curse” problem (the adverse selection in the borrowers pooling) faced on entry into a 
new sector, making diversification very costly. In unregulated settings where intermediaries are new 
or the market is growing rapidly, there should be substantial entry, with many risky intermediaries 
coexisting: investors cannot coordinate their actions, and debt overhang makes the cost of capturing 
market share through rate competition highest when the potential for diversification is greatest. 
Over time, banks will fail, and survivors will gain an incumbency advantage simply by becoming 
the focus of investor beliefs. Banks facing greater competition may therefore find it more attractive 
to specialize. In related work, several models (Dell’Arricia, Friedman, and Marquez, 1999; 
Marquez, 1997; Dell’Arricia, 1998; Gehrig, 1998) suggest that regardless of the bank’s efforts, 
loans in the new sector are likely to perform worse than loans in the bank’s home sector. Worse 
performance for new sector loans also makes diversification more likely to increase the bank’s 
chance of failure and less likely to improve the bank’s monitoring incentives; indeed, diversification 
may even undermine incentives to monitor home sector loans. Overall, diversification is more likely 
to be unattractive.  
Considerable literature exists on banks’ non-traditional activities, it looks at different financial 
activities separately and shows that these activities affect differently the level of risk at an 
individual bank (e.g. Avery and Berger, 1991; Boot and Thakor, 1991; Hassan, 1992, 1993; Hassan 
et al. 1994; Hassan and Sackley, 1994). By definition, diversification involves moving into 
economic sectors that differ from the bank’s home base. Effective loan monitoring requires that the 
lending institution have a thorough understanding of these differences, but building such 
organizational knowledge takes time and effort. Alternatively, diversification of activities within a 
single financial conglomerate could intensify agency problems between corporate insiders and 
small shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since, it is difficult for outsiders to 
directly observe the lending process that a bank is following, with adverse implications on the 
market valuation of the conglomerate.  
Hence, we formulate the first hypothesis: H1. A bank’s monitoring effectiveness may be lower in 
newly entered and competitive sectors, and thus, diversification can result in a poorer quality of 
loans that in turn increase the bank’s loan portfolio risk and reduce return. 
There has been some work on bank specialization and loan performance. A somewhat closer 
study is Besanko and Thakor (1993), who model insured banks allocating loans across two 
uncorrelated sectors. Diversified banks forfeit gains from risk-shifting but increase their odds of 
surviving to collect informational rents on continuing lending relationships; free entry reduces these 
rents, discouraging diversification. In addition to the winner’s curse problem facing new entrants, 
Boot and Thakor (1998) examine incentives to specialize in the face of increased competition. 
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Nonfinancial corporate diversification literature (Denis et al., 1997; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 
2000; Maksimovic and Philips, 2002) generally argues that any firm –financial institution or other– 
should focus on a single line of business so as to take greatest advantage of management’s expertise 
and reduce agency problems, leaving investors to diversify on their own (Jensen, 1986; Berger and 
Ofek, 1996; Servaes, 1996, Denis et al., 1997). Linked corporate literature regarding the 
“diversification discount” finds also that the market value of financial conglomerates that engage in 
multiple activities are lower than if those financial conglomerates where broken into financial 
intermediaries that specialize in the individual activities. According to Demsetz and Strahan (1997), 
the diversification discount may be caused by that too many operating items make the banks lose 
their focus on specialized field. Another reason may cause the diversification discount including the 
inefficient internal resource allocation (Lamont, 1997; Scharfstein, 1997), the informational 
asymmetries between head office and divisional managers (Harris, Kriebel and Raviv, 1992). 
But the features that distinguish banks and other lenders from nonfinancial firms are lenders’ 
greater use of debt finance (leverage) and the way in which lenders’ efforts affect their return 
distributions. With high leverage, worst-case outcomes loom large both in terms of underinvestment 
problems and in terms of outright failure. Although pure diversification tends to reduce the 
frequency of both worst-case and best-case outcomes, diversification that lessens monitoring 
effectiveness may increase the frequency and severity of worst-case outcomes, increasing failure 
probability and underinvestment problems (Winton, 1999). Furthermore, Winton (1999) consider 
that “pure” diversification increases the central tendency of the bank’s return distribution, which 
generally reduces the bank’s chance of failure. Nevertheless, if its loans have sufficiently low 
exposure to sector downturns (“downside”), a specialized bank has a low probability of failure, so 
the benefit of diversification is slight. Also, if its loans have sufficiently high downside, 
diversification can actually increase the bank’s chance of failure. Thus, all else equal, 
diversification’s benefits are greatest when the bank’s loans have moderate levels of downside risk 
and when the bank’s monitoring incentives need strengthening. 
We formulate the second hypothesis: H2. The relationship between bank return and 
diversification is non linear in bank risk (inverted U-shaped). To be precise, diversification across 
loan sectors helps a banks return most when loans have moderate exposure to sector downturns 
(downside risk); when loans have low downside risk, diversification have little benefit; when loans 
have sufficiently high downside risk, diversification may actually reduce its return. 
Broadly speaking, diversification per se is no guarantee of a reduced risk of failure and/or an 
increased return. Contrasting views suggest that neither diversification nor specialization always 
dominates; some circumstances and bank specific differences can favor one strategy or the other. 
More generally, “diversification discount” models predict that firms can differ in terms of 
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expansion opportunities capabilities and ability to exploit market occasions. For example, the 
Maksimovic and Phillips model (2002) of optimal resource allocation of firms shows that as a 
firm’s returns within an industry diminish, the firm limits its growth within the industry and moves 
into other industries. The optimal number and size of industry segments a firm operates depends on 
its comparative advantage across industries, arising from managerial skill in producing within an 
industry. Firms that are very productive in a specific industry have higher opportunity costs of 
diversifying. Thus, inefficient and efficient firms should optimally invest differently when industry 
conditions change.  
Similarly, greater size is required for better diversification at the same time large institutions 
have substantial scale economies linked to improved diversification (Roger and Sinkey, 1999). 
Participation in certain non-traditional activities generally requires employees with special 
knowledge to work in some of these areas. Moreover, a bank might need to employ relatively 
advanced technology for some activities. Larger banks are better equipped to use new technology 
and exploit the resulting cost savings and/or efficiency gains (Hunter and Timme, 1986). 
A more diversified bank may have also greater relative need for equity capital, especially if 
diversification involves expansion into sectors where the bank is less effective (Winton, 1995). 
Banks do use debt for much of their financing, equity capital serves as a buffer to absorb losses and 
reduce the probability of financial distress. In addition, by reducing possible shortfalls on payments 
to debtholders, equity capital reduces the bank’s incentive to engage in risk-shifting by not 
monitoring. Also, high bank profits can be seen as to reduce the likelihood of costly bank runs and 
bank default resulting from bank involvement into new activities. 
In another way, Barth et al. (2004) arguments’ for restricting activities suggest that it improves 
the banking system by avoiding banks from the problems like conflicts of interest, complexity, 
moral hazard and monitoring difficulties. As banks expand to new activities, the restrictions may 
direct banks to less risky and less complicated activities and thus improve bank diversification 
performance. However, if this is not the case, the restrictions may misdirect banks to riskier and 
more complicated activities and thus decrease diversification performance. 
Lastly we formulate the third hypothesis: H3. The diversification performance’s effect is 
inherently different by activities and across banks. There are some situations where financial 
institutions gains greatly from diversification, but this depends on diverse bank specific 
characteristics, as well as regulatory measures. 
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4. Evolving to diversification in emerging market banks: the stylized facts 
from Argentina and Korea 
In this section, we examine the evolution that marked recently emerging markets’ banking 
systems. We focus on stylized facts of two different Latin American and Asian economies –
Argentina and Korea–, which faced banks evolving to diversification of their strategies and 
revenues, with a significant shift toward activities that generate non-interest income.    
 
3.1. Banking diversification and performance in Argentina 
3.1.1. Diversification strategies 
The Argentine convertibility plan ended in January 2002 in the middle of a huge social, financial 
and economic crisis. With a new set of relative prices in place, the economy started its recovery in 
the second half of 2002. The positive evolution of the economy then allowed the financial sector to 
begin its recovery from the crisis, after a period of bank intermediation contraction. The demand for 
credit fell because of recession and the greater reluctance of borrowers to become indebted. At the 
same time, the supply of credit declined: banks become more risk-averse and a major stiffening of 
supervisory oversight reinforced this effect.  
After the crisis, bank credit begun to rise again slowly. Loans grow to 46 percent of the total 
assets against 40 percent of the other-earning assets at the median bank at the end of 2007 (Tab.1). 
Precisely, the share of credit going to the business sector has declined sharply from 48 percent to 25 
percent of total loans between the late of 1997 and 2007. The demand for commercial credit 
declined. Highly rated firms are increasingly able to borrow directly in domestic and international 
capital markets, reducing their reliance on banks. Banks may also ultimately respond to this 
corporate diversification by moving into consumer lending and investment banking-type activities. 
The favorable prospects for economic growth for 2005 and 2006 have set up an encouraging 
scenario for the consumer lending. Consumer loans showed a robust growth from 1 percent to 18 
percent of total loans over the period. However, banks engaged more in securities investment. Its 
share grew considerably to about 25 percent of the other-earning assets at the end of 2007, while 
deposits with banks grew slowly and other investments declined. Off-balance sheet items also 
increased. This evolution reflects the banks moving into investment-banking and related activities 
like securities underwriting and trading, securitization, and derivatives. 
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Tab.1. Argentina: Elements of the banking system’s balance sheet  
 31/12/1997 31/12/2007 
As % of total assets 
Loans  
Other earning assets  
Deposit & ST funding 
Other funding 
Equity  
Off-balance sheet items 
 
As % of total loans 
Commercial loans & bills 
Consumer loans 
Secured loans  
 
As % of total other earning assets 
Deposits with banks 
Securities 
Other investments 
 
45.01 
45.04 
86.44 
0.30 
11.81 
0.76 
 
 
48.37 
1.16 
12.70 
 
 
4.45 
7.83 
32.17 
 
46.24 
40.70 
77.68 
1.88 
13.71 
10.66 
 
 
25.00 
18.84 
7.59 
 
 
9.86 
24.94 
19.62 
Notes: Median value percentages for a sample of 85 Argentine banks.       Source: Authors’ calculation from Bankscope. 
 
This shift toward market related activities has been leading to a blurring of lines across different 
financial institutions and has been facilitated by liberal laws as regards banking and securities 
business. Securities expanded as a cause of the substantial accumulation of holdings of government 
or central bank securities. Increased issuance of government securities has many counterparts: 
larger fiscal deficits, bank recapitalization and the increased local currency financing of budget 
deficits. The market for innovative financial products has continued to expand, and banks have 
increased their off-shore positions over the past decade. Still low interest rates fueled the growth of 
core deposits but the rise was insufficient to fund the increase in banks assets. As a result, banks 
relied more on managed liabilities, which begun to rise slightly last year –most notably long-term 
borrowing. 
 
3.1.2. Bank income and performance 
The income structure of the banking system provides a clear breakdown of the activities and 
income of Argentine banks by lines of business. The extent to which the banking system has been 
moving into investment-banking type business is shown by the diversification of their income 
(Tab.2). While most banks in the country not surprisingly still rely on income from traditional 
banking, the importance of non-traditional business income has increased and is relatively high. 
Realized gains on non-interest activities boost income by 50 percent at median in all banks at the 
end of 2007.  
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Tab.2. Argentina: Structure of the banking system’s income  
 31/12/1997 31/12/2000 31/12/2007 
As % of operating income 
Net interest revenue  
Non-interest income  
 
As % of non-interest income 
Net fees and commissions 
Other non-interest income 
including 
Government & private securities 
Foreign exchange Transactions 
Other 
 
60.13 
39.86 
 
 
80.90 
19.09 
 
12.79 
6.68 
0.00 
 
56.52 
43.47 
 
 
44.25 
55.74 
 
 
 
46.97 
50.02 
 
 
53.04 
47.07 
 
10.83 
2.51 
81.94 
Notes: Median value percentages for a sample of 85 Argentine banks.       Source: Authors’ calculation from Bankscope. 
 
Importantly, gains are greater in retail banks and reached 53 percent of total income at the end-
2007. As a share of total revenue, interest income sharply decreases from 60 percent to about 47 
percent between the late of 1997 and 2007 at the median bank. The share of fees and commissions 
income falls, in favor of the other non-interest revenue share expanded. Loans to the financial 
sector, promissory notes, mortgages and credit cards grew especially fast throughout the period, 
when cash income has contracted to a very low level. Banks increased the share of these loans in 
their portfolios. Investing in these assets, which appear to have relatively higher yields than 
commercial loans, allowed them to limit the decline in the overall rate of return on their assets. 
Tab.3 shows that banking system is very profitable at the end of 2007. Pre-tax profit to assets ratio, 
return on assets, and return on equity were all high and strongly above the level prevailing before 
the 2001 crisis. Profits become from the non-interest activities because the net interest margin 
declined a bit further at these banks from 1 percent between the late of 1997 and 2007. Banks rely 
on managed liabilities for their funding. Because rates paid on these liabilities are more sensitive to 
changes in market interest rates than are rates paid on core deposits, the net interest margin was 
adversely affected. The net interest margin was also eroded by continued intensification of 
competitive pressure and runoffs of their commercial loans. The share of interest-earning assets 
attributable to such loans fell. The large drop was only partially offset by a shift toward higher-
yielding loans, such as credit card loans. Banks also increased their share of interest-earning assets 
that consisted of investment-account securities. Because, rates of return on securities are generally 
lower than those on loans, this shift contributed further to the narrowing of the net interest margin.  
Competition could lower financial intermediation costs and contribute to improvements in bank 
efficiency as shown by the cost to income ratio. The bank efficiency in non-interest services has 
also improved but costs relied to these services remained higher relatively to those of the other 
traditional services. Equity to assets and equity to loans ratios surged at the end-2007, and remains 
above the pre-crisis period level, which means that banks have riskier assets. New non-traditional 
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activities in which banks engaged are more generators of profits than traditional activities, but more 
risky. The continued improvement in overall credit quality driven by the strengthening of household 
and business balance sheets and the ongoing expansion, has allowed banks to further reduce their 
provisions for loans losses.  
 
Tab.3. Argentina: Banking system’s financial ratios (%) 
 31/12/1997 31/12/2000 31/12/2003 31/12/2007 
Pre-tax profit to total assets 
Return on assets (ROA) 
Return on equity (ROE) 
Net interest margin 
 
Cost to income 
Non-interest expenses/ Total revenue 
 
Capital funds to total assets 
Capital funds to net loans 
Equity to assets 
Equity to loans  
Loan loss provisions to loans 
0.9 
1.22 
10.31 
6.04 
 
75.39 
80.60 
 
10.55 
22.64 
11.4 
26.2 
2.31 
0.9 
0.42 
3.38 
5.83 
 
76.63 
84.07 
 
12.53 
28.12 
13.3 
29.9 
2.91 
-0.9 
-1.33 
-5.02 
3.01 
 
94.6 
115.87 
 
21.81 
60.18 
20.75 
65.6 
0.92 
2.3 
1.92 
13.35 
5.07 
 
71.06 
72.69 
 
11.88 
23.53 
14.3 
31.4 
0.62 
Notes: Median value percentages for a sample of 85 Argentine banks.       Source: Authors’ calculation from Bankscope. 
  
3.2. Banking diversification and performance in Korea 
3.2.1. Diversification strategies 
The Korean banking industry has undergone substantial structural reforms since the 1997 
financial crisis. A number of banks merged or exited and foreign banks were permitted to enter the 
banking industry. Healthy banks, meanwhile, were strongly encouraged to seek consolidation and 
develop universal banking services in order to become leaders in the banking industry. The biggest 
and most significant merger took place in November 2001, when Kookmin Bank & Commercial 
Bank merged to create Korea’s largest commercial bank. Because of their strengths and market 
positions, the merger of the two banks has generated a new wave of competitive pressures and 
contributed to further restructuring and consolidation in the banking sector. 
Recapitalization of the financial sector was needed to relieve a paralyzing credit crunch at the 
beginning of the crisis and to restore the proper functioning of banks in their role as financial 
intermediaries. Loans expanded at median bank to 62 percent of total assets at the end of 2007, with 
a doubling of currency domestic lending share to about 80 percent of total loans (Tab.4). More 
interesting, investment and traded securities represent a large part of the other-earning assets of 
Korean banks. Off-balance sheet items also increased at the end of 2007 compared to assets (27 
percent). The saving and time deposits fall sharply, when other sources of funding expanded and 
become almost exclusively formed by bonds and notes at 98 percent last year. Balance sheet data 
point to relatively large holding of securities in relation to total assets. This evolution reflects a 
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greater market orientation of Korean banks regarding their activities and revenues as well as their 
financing. Banks tend to diversify their strategies by moving into new capital-market activities and 
combining them with the traditional intermediation functions. Two factors underline this shift. One 
is the development of the capital markets and the increasing availability of direct financing. The 
other is the change in the behavior and risk exposure of banks to corporate. This led them 
increasingly to emphasize an expansion of their market-focused activities. 
 
Tab.4. Korea: Elements of the banking system’s balance sheet  
 31/12/1997 31/12/2007 
As % of total assets 
Loans  
Other earning assets  
Deposit & ST funding 
Other funding 
Equity  
Off-balance sheet items 
 
As % of total loans 
Notes & bills discounted  
Currency domestic lending 
Foreign currency & overseas lending 
Other lending (incl. Leasing) 
 
As % of total other earning assets 
Deposits with banks 
Traded securities 
Investment securities 
Equity investments 
 
51.03 
38.26 
71.07 
7.36 
7.56 
18.69 
 
 
6.53 
44.47 
6.70 
8.40 
 
 
15.60 
0.86 
46.40 
2.27 
 
62.08 
26.65 
71.24 
10.45 
7.73 
27.18 
 
 
0.94 
79.84 
2.78 
7.26 
 
 
20.12 
4.53 
51.90 
0.93 
Notes: Median value percentages for a sample of 35 Korean banks.           Source: Authors’ calculation from Bankscope. 
 
3.2.2. Bank income and performance 
Diversification in bank strategies into new market activities reflects a major ongoing shift in the 
structure of the Korean banking income. While, the interest revenue remains dominant in this 
structure, its part is in declining in favor of the non-interest income that rose to almost 40 percent of 
the total operating income at the median bank in end-2007 (Tab.5). Loans and discounts contributed 
strongly to the interest income, with a share of 78 percent at the end of 2007, but interest-income 
from securities increased last year to 13 percent. 
The structure of the non-interest income has also shifted toward trading income. The net fees and 
commissions contracted last year to 52 percent against 63 percent in late 1997, when the net trading 
share increases significantly to 27 percent at the median bank. Important gains are realized on 
investment securities, trading securities, and derivatives, respectively 32, 9 and 8.4 percent of the 
trading income at the end-2007. Indeed, the function of banks’ fund distribution to the national 
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economy has changed radically. Banks avoid cut-throat competition in specific asset markets and 
generate new lucrative activities by expanding their investment banking and finance business. 
 
Tab.5. Korea: Structure of the banking system’s income  
 31/12/1997 31/12/2000 31/12/2007 
As % of operating income 
Net interest revenue  
Non-interest income 
 
As % of non-interest income 
Net fees and commissions 
Net trading  
including 
Net gain on traded securities 
Net profit on foreign ex. Transactions 
Net gain on investment securities 
Net profit on derivatives 
Other non-interest income 
 
63.15 
36.84 
 
 
63.02 
8.90 
 
0.00 
100.00 
0.00 
0.00 
57.40 
 
62.50 
38.07 
 
 
66.90 
13.24 
 
 
 
 
 
26.64 
 
60.30 
39.69 
 
 
52.84 
27.36 
 
9.48 
11.30 
32.63 
8.46 
7.62 
Notes: Median value percentages for a sample of 35 Korean banks.           Source: Authors’ calculation from Bankscope. 
 
Strategically, banks need to heighten their profitability by maintaining appropriate interest rate 
spreads that incorporate borrowers’ credit risks and performing better market activities. Banks 
continued to pile up large deficits after the crisis until 2000 because they suffered from the losses 
incurred by non-performing loans, but they have shown profits since 2001. Strikingly, banks 
reached a pre-provisions profit to total assets of 1.80 percent, and had an average ROA of 1.17 
percent and ROE of 14.37 percent in late 2007 (Tab.6). One of the most crucial elements of the 
improvement of profitability is that it has been possible to reduce new provisions against bad loans 
(0.35 percent in end-2007).  
 
Tab.6. Korea: Banking system’s financial ratios (%) 
 31/12/1997 31/12/2000 31/12/2003 31/12/2007 
Pre-provisions profit to total assets 
Return on assets (ROA) 
Return on equity (ROE) 
Net interest margin 
 
Cost to income 
Non-interest expenses/ Total revenue 
 
Capital funds to total assets 
Capital funds to net loans 
Equity to assets 
Equity to loans  
Loan loss provisions to loans 
0.99 
0.29 
4.38 
1.95 
 
75.20 
75.20 
 
4.98 
8.32 
7.60 
9.49 
2.92 
1.15 
0.13 
4.03 
2.07 
 
61.88 
55.25 
 
6.38 
12.01 
4.20 
7.64 
2.80 
1.50 
0.40 
3.71 
2.49 
 
59.12 
47.25 
 
7.35 
11.22 
4.80 
8.19 
1.65 
1.80 
1.17 
14.37 
2.47 
 
58.49 
51.00 
 
8.76 
13.93 
7.70 
12.94 
0.35 
Notes: Median value percentages for a sample of 35 Korean banks.           Source: Authors’ calculation from Bankscope. 
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The build-up of interest bearing assets and the increase of non-interest income from trading, 
contributed to improving banks’ profitability, in spite of the narrowing net interest margin 
compared to the emerging Asia average. Bank efficiency, capitalization and leverage have 
significantly improved since the financial crisis, but capital ratios are still high and comparables to 
those of the crisis level. The level of equity to assets and equity to loans ratios of Korean banks 
reveals also high risk of the held assets. This trend is driven by the increase of banks’ new market 
activities involvement. Korean banks appear relatively efficient in these activities as shown by the 
ratio of non-interest expenses to total revenue that has fallen considerably last year. But, investing 
in business, which appears to have relatively larger and rapid yields than traditional bank 
intermediation activities, allowed them to take and expose themselves to more risk. 
 
5. Variables, data and statistics 
5.1. Variables definition 
5.1.1. Diversification measures 
To measure the income diversification, we follow the basic Herfindhal-type approach. Our 
measure of revenue diversification (DIVREV), accounts for variation in the breakdown of net 
operating income into two broad categories: net interest income and non-interest income. Using this 
breakdown, we measure revenue diversification of the emerging economies banks as: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 = 1 − (𝑆𝐻𝑁𝐸𝑇
2 + 𝑆𝐻𝑁𝑂𝑁
2 ). Where SHNET is the share of net interest income, and SHNON is 
the share of non-interest income, defined as: 𝑆𝐻𝑁𝐸𝑇 =
𝑁𝐸𝑇
𝑁𝐸𝑇+𝑁𝑂𝑁
 ;    𝑆𝐻𝑁𝑂𝑁 =
𝑁𝑂𝑁
𝑁𝐸𝑇+𝑁𝑂𝑁
 .                                                                             
The non-interest income includes commissions and fees income (FEE), and trading and other 
income (TRAD), which the respective shares are defined as: 𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷 =
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷
𝑁𝑂𝑁
 ;  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐸𝐸 =
𝐹𝐸𝐸
𝑁𝑂𝑁
 .                                                                                        
In an analogous fashion, we defined three measures of revenue diversification forms: assets 
diversification as 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑆𝑆 = 1 −  𝑆𝐻𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆
2 + 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝐸𝐴
2  , where SHLOANS is the share of loans, and 
SHOEA is the share of other earning assets (non-lending activities); liabilities or funding 
diversification as 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 = 1 −  𝑆𝐻𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑆
2 + 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝐹
2  , where SHDEPOSITS is the share of deposits, 
and SHOF is the share of other money market funding; and balance sheet diversification as 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐵𝐴𝐿 = 1 −  𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑁𝐵𝐴𝐿
2 + 𝑆𝐻𝑂𝐹𝐵𝐴𝐿
2  , where SHONBAL is the share of on-balance sheet, and 
SHOFBAL is the share of off-balance sheet. 
Diversification variables measure the degree of bank diversification. A higher value indicates a 
more diversified mix. The value 0 means a complete concentration, while 0.5 means a complete 
diversification. 
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5.1.2. Financial performance measures 
We use three types of risk-adjusted performance measures: risk-adjusted return on assets, risk-
adjusted return on equity or Sharpe ratio, and Z-score. Annual accounting data from banks balance 
sheet are utilized to calculate these indicators for each bank individually. Risk-adjusted returns are 
defined as the ratio of return divided by its respective standard deviation as follows: RARROA =
ROA      /σROA  and RARROE = ROE      /σROE . Higher ratios indicate higher risk-adjusted profits. Z-score 
assesses insolvency risk as follows: Z = (ROA      + E/A     )/σROA . Where 𝐸/𝐴       is the average of equity 
to assets ratio. Thus, a higher Z-score indicates improved risk-adjusted performance and lower 
probability of bank insolvency. It’s interpreted as the distance to default or the number of standard 
deviation that a bank’s rate of return of assets has to fall for the bank to become insolvent. 
 
5.1.3. Control variables 
We use three categories of control variables: the operational environment variables, bank 
specific variables, and other dummy variables. Operational environment variables include the 
concentration indicator that measures the competition faced by banks (low index indicates greater 
competition); and the bank freedom index that measures how much latitude a bank has to make 
operating decisions. It is an indicator of relative openness of banking and financial system. Bank 
specific variables control for bank characteristics and differences in the structure and strategy that 
can be expected to affect a bank’s income mix as well as risk and return outcomes. First, the log of 
total assets (Log TA) is used to proxy for bank size and to control for any systematic differences in 
performance across size classes, e.g., scale economies, or different risk-management techniques. 
Second, equity to assets ratio (E/A) is included to measure bank capitalization, and the risk 
preferences of banks, i.e., risk loving banks may hold less equity. Third, the interest share captures 
the percentage of traditional activities. Finally, dummy variables are included for each country, each 
bank type and for the number of years the bank is observed. 
 
5.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
All bank-level data in this study are taken from Bankscope database, which is currently the most 
comprehensive banks data set. The sample period is from 31/12/1997 to 31/12/2007. Banks with 
less than five years of time series observations are eliminated. Other observations with extreme or 
non-sensical values are deleted. In total, 714 banks established in 14 Latin-America and East-Asia 
countries are surveyed (Appendix. Table1). Our overall sample includes banks of different sizes and 
types, although 73% of the sample is comprised of large commercial bank observations 
(Appendix.Table2).  
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5.2.1. Trends on non-interest income share, and bank risk-adjusted performance 
Figure1 shows the growing importance of non-interest income for emerging economies banks 
over time by plotting the non-interest income share. Banks have clearly shifted toward non-interest 
activities. From 1997 to late 2007, banks saw non-interest income as a share of net operating 
revenue rise from 28.2% to stabilize around 36.7% (an increase of 30%). While not surprisingly, 
small banks and very small banks saw an increase of 47% and 57% respectively 
(Appendix.Fig.1A). Steep increases in the non-interest share by end-2007 are seen mainly for 
investment banks and securities houses (Appendix.Fig.1B). The key point is that banks of all sizes 
and types are shifting toward non-interest income, and not just limited to a few mega-banks that 
perform many diverse activities. The biggest increase of non-interest income was in trading and 
other revenue that grew the fastest from 30% of non-interest income in 1997 to 47% by end-2007. 
This shows also the changing focus of bank strategies within non-interest income. 
 
 
  
Fig1. Rising share of non-interest income in operating income  
 
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the relationship between the bank risk-adjusted 
performance as measured by the Sharpe ratio and the Z-score, and the non-interest income. In both 
cases, figure show a strong negative slope across the non-interest income bins. The risk-adjusted 
measures declined steadily. Banks with high non-interest income shares seem to earn lower risk-
adjusted profits and are relatively risky. 
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Fig2. Bank risk-adjusted performance by non-interest income share 
Notes: We reported risk-adjusted performance as measured only by the Sharpe ratio and the Z-score because graphs 
on risk-adjusted return on assets and equity are almost similar. Both measures are averaged for all banks in each bin, 
where bins are created by sorting banks by their average non-interest income share and making 20 equal sized groups 
containing 5 percent of observations of these variables in increasing order. 
 
5.2.2. Bank-level summary statistics 
Table7 displays summary statistics of the main variables used for the 714 emerging countries 
banks in this sample. The banks were quite varied and averaged about $6.77 billion in assets. This 
sample is dominated by a few large banks so the mean greatly exceeds the median. Diversification 
revenue measure ranges from total concentration in net-interest income (0.00) to total 
diversification (0.50). But, the distribution of average diversification for the main sample of 714 
emerging market banks shows an asymmetric distribution with a fatter right-hand tail. This 
indicates not surprisingly that the majority of banks are somewhat diversified in terms of net 
operating revenue. Relatively few banks are seen to rely almost exclusively on non-interest income 
or net-interest income. In fact, the distribution of the non-interest income share peaks for values of 
this variable between 0.40 and 0.45, the overall sample mean of the non-interest income share is 
0.34 (Appendix.Fig.2). Comparing different forms of revenue diversification indicates that 
emerging market banks are more diversified in terms of assets (0.35) than in terms of funding (0.09) 
or balance sheet (0.14). The share of non-earning assets remains significant (46.5% on average), 
and banks focused recently more equally on trading activities, and commissions and fees. On the 
performance side, our sample includes both low- and high-performance banks.  The mean risk-
adjusted return on assets and equity was 1.59 and 1.65, with a range from -1.21 to 13.17 and from -
1.48 to 14.8 respectively; while the mean Z-score was 17.28, with a range from 0.73 to 122.84. 
Table 8 presents correlation matrix to check for possible collinearity among the variables. All 
variables included in the model are weakly correlated with each. 
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Table7. Summary statistics for emerging economies banks 
 Obs Mean Median Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Bank characteristics 
Total Assets ($ millions) 
Equity to Assets (%) 
Interest share (%) 
Operational environment 
Concentration (%) 
Bank freedom 
Diversification revenue 
DIVRev 
DIVAssets 
DIVFund 
DIVBal 
Non-traditional shares 
SHNon (%) 
SHOEA (%) 
SHOF (%) 
SHOFBAL (%) 
Risk-adjusted performance 
RARROA (%) 
Sharpe ratio (RARROE) (%) 
Z-score (%) 
 
714 
714 
714 
 
714 
714 
 
714 
714 
714 
714 
 
714 
714 
714 
714 
 
714 
714 
714 
 
 6777.7 
 20.28 
66.00 
 
62.52 
53.71 
 
0.33 
0.35 
0.09 
0.14 
 
34.00 
46.55 
8.88 
12.75 
 
 1.59 
1.65 
17.28 
 
838.36 
13.21 
70.00 
 
60.80 
49.09 
 
0.35 
0.40 
0.04 
0.11 
 
30.00 
44.39 
2.67 
6.88 
 
1.16 
1.24 
11.70 
 
0.40 
0.17 
0.20 
 
0.25 
14.59 
 
0.11 
0.12 
0.11 
0.13 
 
0.20 
0.22 
0.15 
0.16 
 
0.01 
0.01 
0.16 
 
 7.4 
 2.77 
 0.00 
 
19.50 
34.54 
 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
 
-1.21 
-1.48 
0.73 
 
284841.4 
97.48 
100.00 
 
100.00 
90.00 
 
0.50 
0.49 
0.49 
0.49 
 
97.00 
100.00 
100.00 
94.10 
 
13.17 
14.80 
122.84 
 
 Table8. Correlation matrix between main variables 
 LOG TA E/A Concentration Bank freedom DIVREV SHNON RARROA Sharpe ratio Z-score 
LOG TA 1         
E/A -0.554 1        
Concentration -0.124 -0.010 1       
Bank freedom 0.031 0.065 0.496 1      
DIVREV 0.174 -0.211 0.171 0.051 1     
SHNON -0.071 0.174 0.068 0.113 0.366 1    
RARROA 0.310 -0.161 0.085 0.011 -0.057 -0.263 1   
Sharpe ratio 0.304 -0.170 0.101 -0.009 -0.052 -0.267 0.878 1  
Z-score 0.132 0.055 0.160 0.102 -0.033 -0.202 0.747 0.609 1 
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Our statistical analysis shows a considerable variation in bank strategy and outcomes. This helps 
to identify differences in operating outcomes and performance by differences in the diversification 
measures. To be more formal about the relationship between financial performance and bank 
reliance on non-interest income, we may utilize appropriate empirical regressions. 
 
6. Empirical results 
We investigate empirically our three theoretical hypotheses exposed in section 3. Different 
equations are estimated with OLS. This is essential because all variables are calculated over time 
for each bank as a combination of means and standard deviations for all years the bank is observed. 
 
6.1. The effect of revenue diversification on bank performance 
We test empirically our first theoretical hypothesis H1: A bank’s monitoring effectiveness may be 
lower in newly entered and competitive sectors, and thus, diversification can result in a poorer 
quality of loans that in turn increase the bank’s loan portfolio risk and lower return. We explore 
this issue by examining first how the overall variation in bank strategic focus affects their 
performance, and then we assess more specifically the impact of the different components of the 
non-interest income as well as the different forms of revenue diversification on bank performance.  
 
6.1.1. Revenue diversification, non-interest income and bank performance 
The first regressions examine the overall effect of revenue diversification and non-interest 
income on bank performance. Results are presented in Table9. The control variables coefficients 
appear largely reasonable. Greater bank concentration that means lower competition is associated 
with better performance reported to risk, while financial freedom that allows banks and other 
financial institutions to enter and to operate freely, reduce bank profitability. Size is positively 
associated with return adjusted to risk, which is consistent with the recent scale economies literature 
(Hughes et al., 2001). The positive coefficient on the capital ratio likely signals the risk-aversion of 
banks; relatively safer banks have both high capital ratios and low volatility of income and risk.  
Results on diversification variables show a strong negative correlation between revenue 
diversification and bank risk-adjusted return, which means that banks which exhibit high degrees of 
diversification into non-traditional income display lower return and higher profits’ volatility and 
risk. The coefficient of the non-interest income share itself is negative and highly significant in all 
regressions, suggesting that the negative effect of the revenue diversification on return and risk are 
driven by the greater exposure to the non-interest income share. 
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Table9. The effect of revenue diversification and non-interest income on risk-adjusted performance 
Regressors 
Risk-adjusted return 
Z-score 
RARROA Sharpe ratio 
DIV REV 
 
SH NON  
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Constant 
 
Observations (Adj R
2
) 
-0.0153*** 
[0.0055] 
-0.0196*** 
[0.0024] 
0.0113*** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0001** 
[0.0000] 
0.0095*** 
[0.0034] 
0.0073*** 
[0.0009] 
-0.0111*** 
[0.0045] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0150*** 
[0.0056] 
-0.0197*** 
[0.0025] 
0.0138*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0086*** 
[0.0036] 
0.0072*** 
[0.0011] 
-0.0086** 
[0.0045] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0208 
[0.0551] 
-0.1844*** 
[0.0223] 
0.0970*** 
[0.0295] 
0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2335*** 
[0.0427] 
0.0433*** 
[0.0078] 
-0.1375*** 
[0.0406] 
714 (0.16) 
Notes: Regressions used Y = [RARROA, Sharpe ratio, Z-score] as dependant variables. The estimated equation is: 
𝑌𝑖 =∝ +𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 + 𝛿𝑆𝐻𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 . Where SHNON is the share of non-interest income; DIVREV is the revenue diversification’s 
variable; X is the vector of control variables; and ε is the error terms. Equation is estimated with OLS. Dummy variables for country, 
years and bank type are included in all regressions but not reported. ***, ** indicate significance at 99% and 95% level of significance 
respectively. 
 
 
Globally, estimates indicate that substituting 1% of non-interest revenue for loan revenue would 
reduce significantly ROA adjusted to risk by about 1.67% at the median bank, and reduce Sharpe 
ratio significantly by about 1.59%, while insolvency risk raise significantly by about 1.57%
5
. These 
findings support recent work of DeYoung and Roland (2001), and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) who 
show that diversification gains are more than offset by the cost of increased exposure to the non-
interest activities volatility. These activities may ultimately be profitable, but adjustment costs could 
hold down the short run returns, that they called “the dark side of the search to diversify”. Banks in 
emerging markets may need time to build the business practices, scale, technology, and expertise to 
successfully combine these different products sometimes risky and achieve high-risk adjusted 
profits. 
 
6.1.2. Components of non-interest income and bank performance 
The impact of diversification within non-interest income is split into two components, the 
trading and other income effect, and the commissions and fees income effect. Results of regressions 
reported in Table10 show that the bank exposure to these two business lines is significantly 
different. Fee income increase does not necessarily affect bank outcomes, inversely it can generate 
some improvement in the Sharpe ratio, while high reliance on trading income imply lower 
performance as measured by risk-adjusted returns. Trading income is the most volatile part of non-
interest income (Stiroh, 2006). Hence, it is reasonable that the negative effect of non-interest 
                                                          
5
 Using SHNON estimates in Table9, we report in percentage the coefficient found in each regression multiplied by 1% to 
the corresponding median risk-adjusted return. 
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income on bank return/risk seems essentially driven by the trading income share. This trading result 
is consistent with Estrella (2001), who finds that merger between banking and securities firms are 
less likely to produce gains because of the securities firms’ highly volatile returns.  
 
Table10. The effect of different components of non-interest income on risk-adjusted performance 
Regressors 
Risk-adjusted return 
Z-score 
RARROA Sharpe ratio 
SH NON 
 
SH TRAD  
 
SH FEE  
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Observations (Adj R
2
) 
-0.0249*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0072*** 
[0.0030] 
 
 
0.0145*** 
[0.0042] 
-0.0000* 
[0.0000] 
0.0061 
[0.0044] 
0.0058*** 
[0.0011] 
714 (0.21) 
-0.0261*** 
[0.0035] 
 
 
0.0024 
[0.0034] 
0.0130*** 
[0.0042] 
-0.0000 
[0.0000] 
0.0036 
[0.0043] 
0.0051*** 
[0.0011] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0218*** 
[0.0030] 
-0.0098*** 
[0.0029] 
 
 
0.0170*** 
[0.0038] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0076* 
[0.0042] 
0.0062*** 
[0.0011] 
714 (0.24) 
-0.0239*** 
[0.0033] 
 
 
0.0054* 
[0.0033] 
0.0149*** 
[0.0036] 
-0.0001** 
[0.0000] 
0.0042 
[0.0042] 
0.0053*** 
[0.0010] 
714 (0.23) 
-0.2657*** 
[0.0292] 
-0.0117 
[0.0264] 
 
 
0.1146*** 
[0.0336] 
0.0001 
[0.0005] 
0.1618*** 
[0.0396] 
0.0268*** 
[0.0090] 
714 (0.22) 
-0.2630*** 
[0.0300] 
 
 
-0.0237 
[0.0284] 
0.1144*** 
[0.0345] 
0.0001 
[0.0005] 
0.1576*** 
[0.038 3] 
0.0260*** 
[0.0085] 
714 (0.22) 
Notes: Regressions used Y = [RARROA, Sharpe ratio, Z-score] as dependant variables. Two equations are estimated: 
(1)   𝑌𝑖 =∝ +𝛽𝑆𝐻𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛿𝑆𝐻𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷 𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      ;     (2)   𝑌𝑖 =∝ +𝛽𝑆𝐻𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛿𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖        
Where SHNON is the share of non-interest income; SHTRAD is the share of trading income; SHFEE is the share of fee income; X is the 
vector of control variables; and ε is the error terms. Equations are estimated with OLS. Dummy variables for country, years and bank 
type are included in all regressions but not reported. ***, **, * indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance 
respectively. 
 
6.1.3. Forms of diversification and bank performance 
The impact of revenue diversification is decomposed into three effects: the assets diversification 
effect, the liabilities (funding) diversification effect and the balance sheet diversification effect. 
Results of regressions reported in Table11 indicate that at diverse aspects of diversification are 
associated different implications for bank risk-adjusted performance. 
On the assets diversification’s side, the coefficient of diversification is far from statistical 
significance in all specifications, indicating no impact on adjusted to risk performance from changes 
in the bank assets diversification. Interestingly, the non-earning assets share remains negative and 
statistically significant at 99% level of significance in all three specifications. Results indicate that 
diversification between lending and non-lending activities itself does not drive performance. 
Potential risk-spreading benefits of diversification seem more than outweighed by the increase in 
volatility of the non-lending revenue. Contrarily to the revenue from traditional lending activities 
that is likely to be stable over time, because switching information costs make it costly for either 
borrowers or lenders to walk away from a lending relationship, revenue from non-traditional 
activities are relatively more volatile as supported by many studies (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; 
Stiroh, 2006).  
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Table11. The effect of assets, funding and balance sheet diversification, and their respective non-
traditional income shares on bank risk-adjusted performance 
Regressors 
Risk-adjusted return 
Z-score 
RARROA Sharpe ratio 
DIV ASS 
 
SH OEA 
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Interest share 
 
Observations (Adj R
2
) 
-0.0066 
[0.0049] 
-0.0080*** 
[0.0026] 
0.0079** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0013 
[0.0036] 
0.0050*** 
[0.0009] 
0.0120*** 
[0.0023] 
714 (0.14) 
0.0052 
[0.0046] 
-0.0068*** 
[0.0025] 
0.0105*** 
[0.0034] 
-0.0002*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0005 
[0.0037] 
0.0049*** 
[0.0010] 
0.0128*** 
[0.0023] 
714 (0.15) 
-0.0494 
[0.0421] 
-0.0843*** 
[0.0233] 
0.0714*** 
[0.0297] 
-0.0007* 
[0.0004] 
0.1526*** 
[0.0419] 
0.0242*** 
[0.0080] 
0.0879*** 
[0.0214] 
714 (0.11) 
DIV FUND 
 
SH OF 
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Interest share 
 
Observations (Adj R
2
) 
-0.0094 
[0.0077] 
0.0044 
[0.0047] 
0.0077** 
[0.0038] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0057* 
[0.0033] 
0.0040*** 
[0.0008] 
0.0129*** 
[0.0023] 
714 (0.13) 
-0.0118* 
[0.0072] 
0.0033 
[0.0045] 
0.0104*** 
[0.0034] 
-0.0002*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0055* 
[0.0034] 
0.0042*** 
[0.0009] 
0.0139*** 
[0.0023] 
714 (0.15) 
-0.0290 
[0.0637] 
0.0085 
[0.0434] 
0.0672** 
[0.0301] 
-0.0006 
[0.0004] 
0.0919** 
[0.0405] 
0.0133** 
[0.0067] 
0.0915*** 
[0.0220] 
714 (0.09) 
DIV BAL 
 
SH OFBAL 
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Interest share 
 
Observations (Adj R
2
) 
-0.0188*** 
[0.0077] 
0.0159*** 
[0.0060] 
0.0077** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0054* 
[0.0031] 
0.0041*** 
[0.0008] 
0.0119*** 
[0.0023] 
714 (0.14) 
-0.0227*** 
[0.0082] 
0.0247*** 
[0.0070] 
0.0103*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0002*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0055* 
[0.0031] 
0.0043*** 
[0.0009] 
0.0125*** 
[0.0023] 
714 (0.16) 
-0.1572 
[0.1626] 
0.0888 
[0.1565] 
0.0701*** 
[0.0297] 
-0.0006 
[0.0004] 
0.0846*** 
[0.0349] 
0.0143** 
[0.0066] 
0.0902*** 
[0.0210] 
714 (0.10) 
Notes: Regressions used Y = [RARROA, Sharpe ratio, Z-score] as dependant variables. Three equations are estimated: 
(1)   𝑌𝑖 =∝ +𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑆𝐻𝑂𝐸𝐴𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      ;     (2)   𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 𝑖 + 𝛿𝑆𝐻𝑂𝐹𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖        
(3)  𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐵𝐴𝐿 𝑖 + 𝛿𝑆𝐻𝑂𝐹𝐵𝐴𝐿 𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 . Where DIVASS is the assets diversification’s variable; SHOEA is the share of the 
other earning assets; DIVFUND is the funding diversification’s variable; SHOF is the share of the other money market funding; DIVBAL 
is the balance sheet diversification’s variable; SHOFBAL is the share of the off-balance sheet; X is the vector of control variables; and ε 
is the error terms. Equations are estimated with OLS. Dummy variables for country, years and bank type are included in all 
regressions but not reported. ***, **, * indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance respectively. 
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This real negative volatility impact from non-lending income is combined with a “new toy effect” 
due to changes in management behavior as management shifts focus toward newly-acquired 
segments (Schoar, 2002). 
On the liabilities diversification’s side, estimates show a weak negative correlation between bank 
funding strategies mix and risk-adjusted performance, which is only found to be statistically 
significant at 90% level of significance on the Sharpe ratio regression. Results suggest that 
combining deposit and non-deposit money market funding contributes to alleviate bank leverage 
and to reduce their profits. Mainly because rates paid on the money-market funding are higher, 
volatile and more sensitive to changes in market interest rates than are paid on core deposits, the 
bank return can be adversely affected. The coefficient of the other funding share is nevertheless 
estimated to have an insignificant impact on the bank risk-adjusted performance. This can be 
interpreted by the relatively low dependence of emerging market banks on managed liabilities. 
The balance sheet diversification’s results indicate however that diversification variable enters 
risk-adjusted return regressions with negative and statistically significant signs. By mixing on and 
off-balance sheet activities, banks may increase their risk-taking and reduce their ability to better 
conduct balance sheet activities in favor of other activities quite diversified in nature and beyond 
their core expertise and knowledge, like securities clearance and brokerage activities, data 
processing services, and investment and management advisory services (Hassan, 1993). Off-balance 
sheet items include also loan commitments, financial futures and options contracts, standby letters 
of credit, foreign exchange contracts, and other derivative products. Although, banks focus on such 
branches can be highly profitable, as shown by the strong positive coefficient found for the off-
balance sheet share. Most obviously, these new activities involve risks which are difficult to 
quantify and requires certain economies of specialization and know-how.   
In sum, our results validate the first hypothesis H1. Findings are consistent with a theory that 
predicts deterioration in bank monitoring quality and return upon lending expansion into newer or 
competitive industries. A robust empirical result that emerges from the analysis and corroborates 
Acharya et al., (2006) is that diversification of income is not guaranteed to produce superior 
performance and/or greater safety for banks. 
 
6.2. The relationship between revenue diversification, risk and bank performance 
We study empirically our second theoretical hypothesis H2: The relationship between bank 
return and diversification is non-linear in bank risk (inverted U-shaped). To examine the nature of 
this relationship, we conduct estimations on risk-adjusted performance using first the overall 
revenue diversification’s measure, and second the different diversification variables. 
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First regressions results are reported in Table12. Control variables are generally significant and 
have the expected signs in all regression specifications. The coefficients on the diversification 
revenue variable used directly and as a quadratic, are negative and positive respectively, and are 
statistically significant at 99% level of significance. This holds for all three measures of bank risk-
adjusted performance. These results provide support for the U-shape hypothesis (H2) describing the 
relationship between diversification and performance, conditional on the risk level of the bank. 
Results are interpreted as diversification has a slight benefit at low bank risk levels, has maximum 
benefits at moderate risk levels and hurts bank return at very high risk levels.  
 
Table12. The non-linear relationship between revenue diversification and risk-adjusted performance 
Regressors 
Risk-adjusted return 
Z-score 
RARROA Sharpe ratio 
DIV REV 
 
(DIV REV)
2 
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Interest share  
 
Constant 
 
Observations (Adj R
2
) 
-0.0899*** 
[0.0243] 
0.1286*** 
[0.0418] 
0.0123*** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0001** 
[0.0000] 
0.0103*** 
[0.0034] 
0.0074*** 
[0.0009] 
0.0201*** 
[0.0024] 
-0.0232*** 
[0.0060] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0891*** 
[0.0252] 
0.1278*** 
[0.0428] 
0.0148*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0094*** 
[0.0036] 
0.0073*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0202*** 
[0.0026] 
-0.0209*** 
[0.0062] 
714 (0.21) 
-0.5524*** 
[0.2351] 
0.9169*** 
[0.3808] 
0.1041*** 
[0.0295] 
0.0000 
[0.0004] 
0.2390*** 
[0.0425] 
0.0438 *** 
[0.0078] 
0.1879*** 
[0.0225] 
-0.2684*** 
[0.0522] 
714 (0.16) 
Notes: Regressions used Y = [RARROA, Sharpe ratio, Z-score] as dependant variables. The estimated equation is: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖
2 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 . Where DIVREV is the revenue diversification variable used directly and as a quadratic; X 
is the vector of control variables; and ε is the error terms. The quadratic term of DIVREV is incorporated to detect an expected 
inverted-U shape relationship. Equation is estimated with OLS. Dummy variables for country, years and bank type are included in all 
regressions but not reported. ***, ** indicate significance at 99% and 95% level of significance respectively. 
 
The second regressions examine the relationship between diversification, risk and bank 
performance, with considering the different forms of diversification –assets diversification, funding 
diversification and balance sheet diversification. Earlier results are qualitatively robust to different 
diversification variables as seen in Table13. The non-linear relationship between diversification, 
risk and bank performance continues to hold though the coefficients are less significant statistically 
than under Table12. More generally, assets and balance sheet diversification appear to increase 
performance at moderate levels of risk, but reduce performance at very high levels of risk.  
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Table13. The non-linear relationship between different forms of diversification and bank performance 
Regressors 
Risk-adjusted return 
Z-score 
RARROA Sharpe ratio 
DIV ASSS 
 
(DIV ASS)
2 
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Interest share 
 
Constant 
 
Observations (Adj R2) 
-0.0636*** 
[0.0210] 
0.1206*** 
[0.0382] 
0.0107*** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0000* 
[0.0000] 
0.0119*** 
[0.0034] 
0.0068*** 
[0.0010] 
0.0236*** 
[0.0025] 
-0.0300*** 
[0.0055] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0439** 
[0.0204] 
0.0879*** 
[0.0366] 
0.0131*** 
[0.0034] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0111*** 
[0.0036] 
0.0068*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0235*** 
[0.0025] 
-0.0301*** 
[0.0055] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.2739 
[0.1725] 
0.5801* 
[0.3200] 
0.0962*** 
[0.0290] 
0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2415*** 
[0.0417] 
0.0406*** 
[0.0081] 
0.1920*** 
[0.0234] 
-0.3083*** 
[0.0492] 
714 (0.16) 
DIV FUND 
 
(DIV FUND)
2
 
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Interest share 
 
Constant 
 
Observations (Adj R2) 
-0.0258* 
[0.0169] 
0.0592 
[0.0432] 
0.0111*** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0000* 
[0.0000] 
0.0105*** 
[0.0034] 
0.0078*** 
[0.0010] 
0.0242*** 
[0.0026] 
-0.0371*** 
[0.0048] 
714 (0.19) 
-0.0243* 
[0.0151] 
0.0385 
[0.0390] 
0.0135*** 
[0.0034] 
-0.0000*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0097*** 
[0.0035] 
0.0077*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0244*** 
[0.0026] 
-0.0348*** 
[0.0046] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.1600 
[0.1396] 
0.3339 
[0.3672] 
0.0966*** 
[0.0293] 
0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2345*** 
[0.0423] 
0.0461*** 
[0.0079] 
0.1929*** 
[0.0240] 
-0.3314*** 
[0.0429] 
714 (0.16) 
DIV BAL 
 
(DIV BAL)
2 
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Interest share 
 
Constant 
 
Observations (Adj R2) 
-0.0418*** 
[0.0149] 
0.1066*** 
[0.0352] 
0.0129*** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0001** 
[0.0000] 
0.0116*** 
[0.0035] 
0.0073*** 
[0.0010] 
0.0219*** 
[0.0025] 
-0.0346*** 
[0.0049] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0391*** 
[0.0143] 
0.1100*** 
[0.0338] 
0.0155*** 
[0.0034] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0112*** 
[0.0035] 
0.0072*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0221*** 
[0.0025] 
-0.0327*** 
[0.0047] 
714 (0.21) 
-0.0941 
[0.1295] 
0.1688 
[0.3024] 
0.0999*** 
[0.0296] 
0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2331*** 
[0.0413] 
0.0429*** 
[0.0079] 
0.1865*** 
[0.0233] 
-0.3225*** 
[0.0441] 
714 (0.16) 
Notes: Regressions used Y = [RARROA, Sharpe ratio, Z-score] as dependant variables. Three equations are estimated: 
(1) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖
2 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    ;      (2) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 𝑖
2 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 .  
(3) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐵𝐴𝐿 𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐵𝐴𝐿 𝑖
2 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 . Where DIVASS, DIVFUND, and DIVBAL are respectively the assets, the funding and the 
balance sheet diversification’s variables; X is the vector of control variables; and ε is the error terms. Dummy variables for country, 
years and bank type are included in all regressions but not reported. ***, **, * indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% level of 
significance respectively. 
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Consistent with our second hypothesis, findings support Winton (1999)’s arguments that 
diversification across loan sectors helps a banks return most when loans have moderate exposure to 
sector downturns; when loans have low downside risk, diversification have little benefit; when 
loans have sufficiently high downside risk, diversification may actually reduce its return. 
 
6.3. The effect of revenue diversification with controlling key banking aspects 
We investigate empirically our third theoretical hypothesis H3: The diversification 
performance’s effect is inherently different with activities and across banks. There are some 
situations where financial institutions gains greatly from diversification. But, this depends on 
diverse bank specific characteristics, as well as regulatory measures. We examine this issue by 
considering three banking aspects: the credit institution type, the bank specific characteristics and 
the regulatory restrictions. The rationale behind testing for key banking aspects is that different 
banks all have differing functions, restrictions and ownership structure. As a consequence, they 
adopt distinct approaches to diversification to achieve their strategic objectives. 
 
6.3.1. Diversification revenue and the bank type 
First, we examine if bank type impacts upon diversification benefits. We retain the methodology 
employed in earlier regressions and additionally control for bank type by introducing dummy 
variables. Table14 reports estimates of the diversification interacted with dummy variables of 
commercial banks (column1), investment banks (column2), non-banks credit institutions (column3) 
and other-banks (column4).  
Results show that the coefficient of the diversification interaction variables vary significantly 
with the bank type, contrarily to the coefficient of the non-interest income share which is found to 
be generally negative in all specifications. The diversification effect appears positive and 
quantitatively large for other-banks category, comparatively less significant for commercial banks, 
and insignificant for the investment banks and the non-banks credit institutions. Interestingly, the 
other-banks category includes highly specialized ones such as saving banks, cooperative banks, real 
estate and mortgage banks, medium and long term credit banks, so some activities diversification 
seems specifically benefic to enhance return and to lower the concentration risk. This result is 
aligned with the findings of Brunner et al. (2004) who report that specialized bank institutions as 
cooperative banks tend to reap higher returns from diversification than other banks. Diversification 
provides also some gains for commercial banks as measured by the risk-adjusted ROA and the Z-
score. This may be due to distinct competitive advantage that those banks hold from their access to 
private information so as to enhance decision making. 
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 Table14. Revenue diversification, bank type and risk-adjusted performance 
Regressors 
Risk-adjusted return 
Z-score 
RARROA Sharpe ratio 
DIV REV *Dum Commer 
 
DIV REV *Dum Invest 
 
DIV REV *Dum Non-banks 
 
DIV REV *Dum Other  
 
SH NON *Dum Commer 
 
SH NON *Dum Invest 
 
SH NON *Dum Non-banks 
 
SH NON *Dum Other  
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Constant 
 
Observations (Adj R
2
) 
0.0130* 
[0.0078] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0277*** 
[0.0048] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0116*** 
[0.0038] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0084** 
[0.0036] 
0.0071*** 
[0.0010] 
-0.0120*** 
[0.0050] 
714 (0.17) 
 
 
0.0001 
[0.0062] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0077** 
[0.0033] 
 
 
 
 
0.0092*** 
[0.0038] 
-0.0001** 
[0.0000] 
0.0079** 
[0.0035] 
0.0070*** 
[0.0010] 
-0.0183*** 
[0.0045] 
714 (0.13) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0042 
[0.0106] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0081 
[0.0058] 
 
 
0.0102*** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0001** 
[0.0000] 
0.0077** 
[0.0035] 
0.0072*** 
[0.0010] 
-0.0195*** 
[0.0046] 
714 (0.13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0537** 
[0.0257] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0462** 
[0.0234] 
0.0100*** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0001** 
[0.0000] 
0.0076** 
[0.0035] 
0.0072*** 
[0.0010] 
-0.0177*** 
[0.0045] 
714 (0.13) 
0.0125 
[0.0080] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0271*** 
[0.0047] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0141*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0074** 
[0.0037] 
0.0069*** 
[0.0011] 
-0.0095** 
[0.0049] 
714 (0.17) 
 
 
-0.0012 
[0.0065] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0073** 
[0.0035] 
 
 
 
 
0.0117*** 
[0.0035] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0070** 
[0.0037] 
0.0068*** 
[0.0011] 
-0.0157*** 
[0.0044] 
714 (0.14) 
 
 
 
 
0.0001 
[0.0126] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0100 
[0.0068] 
 
 
0.0127*** 
[0.0034] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0067* 
[0.0036] 
0.0071*** 
[0.0011] 
-0.0167*** 
[0.0044] 
714 (0.14) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0566** 
[0.0246] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0510*** 
[0.0211] 
0.0125*** 
[0.0034] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0065* 
[0.0036] 
0.0071*** 
[0.0011] 
-0.0152*** 
[0.0045] 
714 (0.14) 
0.2089*** 
[0.0725] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.2453*** 
[0.0410] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0974*** 
[0.0306] 
-0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2184*** 
[0.0429] 
0.0395*** 
[0.0081] 
-0.1555*** 
[0.0456] 
714 (0.13) 
 
 
0.0066 
[0.0550] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0814*** 
[0.0290] 
 
 
 
 
0.0830*** 
[0.0302] 
0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2102*** 
[0.0439] 
0.0407*** 
[0.0082] 
-0.1794*** 
[0.0405] 
714 (0.11) 
 
 
 
 
0.0162 
[0.0681] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.1520*** 
[0.0373] 
 
 
0.0941*** 
[0.0297] 
-0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2106*** 
[0.0421] 
0.0437*** 
[0.0081] 
-0.1945*** 
[0.0415] 
714 (0.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.5791*** 
[0.2203] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.3657** 
[0.1629] 
0.0895*** 
[0.0298] 
0.0000 
[0.0004] 
0.2141*** 
[0.0438] 
0.0433*** 
[0.0081] 
-0.1696*** 
[0.0404] 
714 (0.11) 
Notes: Regressions used Y = [RARROA, Sharpe ratio, Z-score] as dependant variables. Four equations are estimated:  
(1) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖 + 𝛿𝑆𝐻𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  ;                (2) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖 + 𝛿𝑆𝐻𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      ;              
(3) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑖 + 𝛿𝑆𝐻𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  ;       (4) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑂𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑟 𝑖 + 𝛿𝑆𝐻𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑂𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
Where DIVREV*DumCommer, DIVREV*DumInvest, DIVREV*DumNon-banks,and DIVREV*DumOther are respectively the diversification interaction terms with commercial banks, investment banks, non-banks, and 
other-banks dummy variables; SHNON*DumCommer, SHNON*DumInvest,  SHNON*DumNon-banks,  and SHNON*DumOther are the share of non-interest income interacted with different bank type dummy variables; X 
is the vector of control variables; and ε is the error terms. The category of commercial banks includes commercial banks, and banks holding and holding companies; the category of investment banks 
includes investment banks and securities houses; the category of non-banking credit institutions includes non-bank credit institutions, specialized government credit institutions, and micro-financing 
institutions; and the category of other-banks include saving banks, cooperative banks, real estate and mortgage banks, Islamic banks, medium and long term credit banks, and multilateral government banks. 
Dummy variables for country, years and bank type are included in all regressions but not reported. ***, **, * indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance respectively. 
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Conforming to our third hypothesis, the empirical diversification effect is seen to be no 
homogeneous across bank types, mainly because banks of different types have more or less 
complex organization why they differ materially in both the non-interest income share and the 
degree of diversification. Most obviously, a bank’s type entails a specific charter that outlines 
allowed and disallowed bank activities. Non-banking credit institutions, for instance may not be 
allowed to engage in investment banking activities, which limits their potential to generate non-
interest income; while investment banks are naturally well diversified toward non-traditional 
activities, so more diversification don’t exert a significant impact. Additional regressions on the 
different diversification aspects –assets, funding and balance sheet diversification– interacted with 
bank types are also conducted but not reported because providing almost similar quantitative results 
by bank type. These regressions provide further evidence that certain bank categories, particularly 
commercial banks and other-banks benefit from assets, funding and balance sheet diversification. 
 
6.3.2. Diversification revenue and the bank specific characteristics  
Second, we examine how the impact of diversification may vary with banks characteristics. 
Table15 reports estimates of regressions with the diversification revenue interacted with bank size 
(column1), growth (column2), profitability (column3), capitalization (column4), and efficiency 
(column5). Only regressions on the Sharpe ratio and the Z-score are reported, because results on 
risk-adjusted ROA and Sharpe ratio are almost quantitatively similar. 
Results show that the diversification interaction terms enter all regressions positively, inversely 
to a strong negative coefficient found when the diversification variable is introduced separately. 
With bank specific characteristics interaction, it appears that banks tend to reap gain from revenue 
diversification, but this gain differs notably with banks variation in performance. Not surprisingly, 
efficient banks have large benefits from revenue diversification, mainly because they are able to 
perform new activities more efficiently. Well-capitalized banks benefit also from the risk 
preventing effect from diversification. This finding is consistent with the idea that high capital 
banks protect better their charter value. Large banks are also likely to benefit from income 
diversification and to improve risk-adjusted performance. One interpretation is that larger banks, 
which have been involved in banking activities for a longer period of time, have had time to reach 
the optimal level of diversification. Moreover, they are more likely to have implemented the 
business practices and advanced technology needed to be successful for some activities. Hunter and 
Timme (1986) found that larger banks are better equipped to use new technology and to exploit the 
resulting cost savings and/or efficiency gains. Other banks characteristics such as growth or 
profitability are less relevant in how to exploit the diversification potential. 
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Table15. Revenue diversification, bank specific characteristics and risk-adjusted performance 
Regressors 
Risk-adjusted return 
Z-score 
Sharpe ratio 
DIV REV 
 
DIV REV* Size 
 
DIV REV* Growth 
 
DIV REV* Profitability 
 
DIV REV* Capital 
 
DIV REV* Efficiency 
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Interest share  
 
Constant 
 
Observations (Adj R
2
) 
-0.0712*** 
[0.0086] 
0.0201*** 
[0.0030] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0145*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0072** 
[0.0034] 
 
 
0.0192*** 
[0.0025] 
-0.0082** 
[0.0040] 
714 (0.21) 
-0.0157*** 
[0.0056] 
 
 
0.0024* 
[0.0013] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0141*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0086*** 
[0.0036] 
0.0072*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0197*** 
[0.0025] 
-0.0286*** 
[0.0054] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0171*** 
[0.0055] 
 
 
 
 
0.0005*** 
[0.0001] 
 
 
 
 
0.0150*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0078** 
[0.0035] 
0.0076*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0180*** 
[0.0025] 
-0.0287*** 
[0.0054] 
714 (0.21) 
-0.0196*** 
[0.0055] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0143 
[0.0111] 
 
 
0.0133*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
 
 
0.0068*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0187*** 
[0.0025] 
-0.0244*** 
[0.0048] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0229*** 
[0.0060] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.4550*** 
[0.1368] 
0.0133*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0064* 
[0.0037] 
0.0066*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0180*** 
[0.0026] 
-0.0246*** 
[0.0055] 
714 (0.21) 
-0.3481*** 
[0.0790] 
0.1176*** 
[0.0206] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1000*** 
[0.0301] 
0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2224*** 
[0.0419] 
 
 
0.1815*** 
[0.0225] 
-0.2011*** 
[0.0404] 
714 (0.16) 
-0.0234 
[0.0555] 
 
 
0.0092 
[0.0147] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0982*** 
[0.0297] 
0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2334*** 
[0.0427] 
0.0435*** 
[0.0078] 
0.1844*** 
[0.0223] 
-0.3230*** 
[0.0460] 
714 (0.15) 
-0.0182 
[0.0560] 
 
 
 
 
-0.0006 
[0.0021] 
 
 
 
 
0.0955*** 
[0.0296] 
0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2345*** 
[0.0428] 
0.0427*** 
[0.0079] 
0.1865*** 
[0.0230] 
-0.3217*** 
[0.0460] 
714 (0.15) 
-0.1814*** 
[0.0555] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.6119*** 
[0.1339] 
 
 
0.0885*** 
[0.0296] 
0.0002 
[0.0004] 
 
 
0.0407*** 
[0.0079] 
0.1626*** 
[0.0220] 
-0.2411*** 
[0.0417] 
714 (0.15) 
-0.0576 
[0.0567] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1256** 
[1.0184] 
0.0949*** 
[0.0294] 
0.0001 
[0.0004] 
0.2230*** 
[0.0433] 
0.0406*** 
[0.0078] 
0.1763*** 
[0.0228] 
-0.3045*** 
[0.0465] 
714 (0.16) 
Notes: Regressions used Y = [RARROA, Sharpe ratio, Z-score] as dependant variables. Five equations are estimated: (1) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  ;     
(2) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖       ;     (3) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  ;   
(4) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖       ;     (5) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 . 
Where DIVREV*Sizer, DIVREV*Growth, DIVREV*Profitability, DIVREV*Capital, and DIVREV*Efficiency are respectively the diversification interaction terms with size, growth, profitability, capital, and 
efficiency; X is the vector of control variables; and ε is the error terms. Bank size, growth, profitability, capital and efficiency are controlled respectively by Log total assets, assets growth, net interest 
margin, equity to assets, and income to cost ratio. Dummy variables for country, years and bank type are included in all regressions but not reported. ***, **, * indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% level 
of significance respectively. 
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Our findings imply that very large, well-capitalized and more efficient banks have more 
incentives to diversify. They perform better than the other or the specialized ones; traditional forms 
of intermediation are less profitable for them. Extended regressions on the different diversification 
forms –assets, funding and balance sheet diversification– interacted with bank specific characteristics 
are also conducted but not reported due to similarly quantitative results. Regressions consistent with 
our third hypothesis, confirm that banks reap profit and stability gains from assets, funding and 
balance sheet diversification, particularly when they are large, highly capitalized and efficient. 
 
6.3.3. Diversification revenue and the regulatory restrictions 
Finally, we check how differences in bank regulation may further affect performance. We retain 
the methodology employed in previous regressions and additionally control for regulatory 
restrictions by introducing interaction terms. Table16 reports estimates of the diversification 
interacted with securities restrictions (column1), insurance restrictions (column2), real estate 
restrictions (column3), and hazard moral mitigating factors (column 4).  
Results on the risk-adjusted returns indicate that if banks face more enforcement in restrictions on 
securities or real estate activities or in factors mitigating hazard moral as they diversify to non-
traditional activities, they avoid the negative diversification effect as shown by the insignificant 
coefficient of the diversification interaction terms. In contrast, restrictions on insurance strengthen 
the poor diversification return of banks, as seen by the negative correlation between diversification 
interaction term and the Sharpe ratio. This suggests that banks can reap benefits from consolidating 
banking and insurance agency activities. According to Chang and Elyasini (2008), we find that 
synergies do exist between banking and insurance activities. Contrarily to the securities or real estate 
businesses that imply cost to develop skills and expertise to handle uncertain risk, the insurance 
activities require comparatively a low level of investment and they are more profitable than banking 
services. As Saunders and Walter (1994) have pointed out, certain insurance products, e.g. credit life 
insurance, mortgage insurance, and auto insurance tend to have natural synergistic links to bank 
lending and they can be viewed as a continuity of the bank traditional activities. The hazard moral 
result also interesting is conforming to the agency theory; mitigating moral hazard limit the agency 
problems from diversification. Regarding the Z-score regressions, results show that more restrictions 
on securities activities or an enforcement of factors mitigating hazard moral lead to increase bank 
insolvency risk, when other activities restrictions don’t have a significant effect. Not surprisingly, 
financial consolidation across securities activities offer some opportunities for lowering the portfolio 
risk and the likelihood of financial firm failure, while factors mitigating hazard moral, generally by 
limiting the explicit deposit insurance guarantee or the government intervention as a lending in last 
resort, may decrease the scope of safety net. 
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Table16. Diversification revenue, regulatory restrictions and risk-adjusted performance 
Regressors 
Risk-adjusted return 
Z-score 
RARROA Sharpe ratio 
DIV REV 
 
DIV REV* Securities  
 
DIV REV* Insurance  
 
DIV REV* Real-estate 
 
DIV REV* Hazard 
 
Bank concentration 
 
Bank freedom 
 
Equity to assets 
 
Log total assets 
 
Interest share  
 
Constant 
 
Observations (Adj R
2
) 
-0.0107 
[0.0069] 
-0.0024 
[0.0020] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0121*** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0001** 
[0.0000] 
0.0090*** 
[0.0034] 
0.0072*** 
[0.0009] 
0.0190*** 
[0.0025] 
-0.0291*** 
[0.0054] 
714 (0.20) 
0.0008 
[0.0122] 
 
 
-0.0060 
[0.0041] 
 
 
 
 
0.0115*** 
[0.0037] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0096*** 
[0.0034] 
0.0075*** 
[0.0009] 
0.0186*** 
[0.0026] 
-0.0288*** 
[0.0054] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0196** 
[0.0084] 
 
 
 
 
0.0016 
[0.0026] 
 
 
0.0111*** 
[0.0036] 
-0.0000 
[0.0000] 
0.0097*** 
[0.0034] 
0.0072*** 
[0.0009] 
0.0200*** 
[0.0025] 
-0.0326*** 
[0.0062] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0179* 
[0.0109] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0070 
[0.0059] 
0.0230*** 
[0.0077] 
0.0000 
[0.0001] 
0.0099** 
[0.0046] 
0.0071*** 
[0.0014] 
0.0196*** 
[0.0034] 
-0.0427*** 
[0.0112] 
714 (0.23) 
-0.0143** 
[0.0071] 
-0.0003 
[0.0023] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0139*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0085*** 
[0.0036] 
0.0072*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0196*** 
[0.0026] 
-0.0281*** 
[0.0055] 
714 (0.20) 
0.0159 
[0.0137] 
 
 
-0.0115*** 
[0.0044] 
 
 
 
 
0.0141*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0087*** 
[0.0035] 
0.0076*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0178*** 
[0.0026] 
-0.0245*** 
[0.0054] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0165* 
[0.0089] 
 
 
 
 
0.0005 
[0.0027] 
 
 
0.0137*** 
[0.0033] 
-0.0001*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0087*** 
[0.0036] 
0.0072*** 
[0.0011] 
0.0198*** 
[0.0026] 
-0.0290*** 
[0.0062] 
714 (0.20) 
-0.0301*** 
[0.0103] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0009 
[0.0056] 
0.0230*** 
[0.0070] 
-0.0001 
[0.0000] 
0.0090* 
[0.0049] 
0.0077*** 
[0.0016] 
0.0211*** 
[0.0035] 
-0.0354*** 
[0.0106] 
714 (0.22) 
0.0880 
[0.0685] 
-0.0576*** 
[0.0172] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1144*** 
[0.0298] 
-0.0004 
[0.0005] 
0.2213*** 
[0.0432] 
0.0411*** 
[0.0079] 
0.1698*** 
[0.0227] 
-0.2834*** 
[0.0477] 
714 (0.16) 
-0.0756 
[0.1156] 
 
 
0.0203 
[0.0342] 
 
 
 
 
0.0964*** 
[0.0291] 
0.0002 
[0.0004] 
0.2333*** 
[0.0427] 
0.0426*** 
[0.0076] 
0.1877*** 
[0.0233] 
-0.3288*** 
[0.0478] 
714 (0.15) 
-0.0301 
[0.0810] 
 
 
 
 
0.0035 
[0.0213] 
 
 
0.0966*** 
[0.0288] 
0.0001 
[0.0005] 
0.2338*** 
[0.0428] 
0.0431*** 
[0.0076] 
0.1853*** 
[0.02322] 
-0.3260*** 
[0.0540] 
714 (0.15) 
0.1065 
[0.0922] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.1242*** 
[0.0451] 
0.2018*** 
[0.0550] 
0.0021** 
[0.0010] 
0.2140*** 
[0.0585] 
0.0327 *** 
[0.0106] 
0.1529*** 
[0.0282] 
-0.4447*** 
[0.0836] 
714 (0.18) 
Notes: Regressions used Y = [RARROA, Sharpe ratio, Z-score] as dependant variables. Four equations are estimated:  
(1 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖              ;     (2) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  ;   
(3) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 − 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖       ;     (4) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑅𝐸𝑉 𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 . 
Where DIVREV*Securities, DIVREV*Insurance, DIVREV*Real-estate, and DIVREV*Hazard are respectively the diversification interaction terms with indexes of securities, insurance and real-estate restrictions, and 
hazard moral mitigating; X is the vector of control variables; and ε is the error terms. Regulatory variables are from Ross Levine database (2003). Dummy variables for country, years and bank type are included 
in all regressions but not reported. ***, **, * indicate significance at 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance respectively. 
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In sum, regulatory restrictions are seen to drive different diversification effects on bank 
performance, further validating our third hypothesis. This differential effect is robust to the diverse 
forms of revenue diversification. Additional tests on assets, funding and balance sheet 
diversification combined with regulatory restrictions confirm our earlier findings
6
. Insurance 
activities may provide a beneficial area in which banks can engage, but securities and real-estate 
activities must be regulated. At the same time, the Z-score still adversely affected by the regulation 
of both securities activities and hazard moral. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
The contribution of this paper is to study the implications of the recent banks involvement in 
emerging market economies toward non-traditional intermediation activities that generate non-
interest income. While traditional banking theory recommends that the optimal organization of a 
bank is one where it is fully diversified, our results suggest that empirically, there seem to be 
diseconomies of diversification for certain banks. These diseconomies arise in the form of poor 
monitoring incentives that induce greater risk of default and decrease return when a bank expands 
into industries where it faces lack skills and expertise. 
Evidence suggests that diversification gains are more than offset by the cost of increased 
exposure to the non-interest based activities, more specifically by the trading income volatility. 
More generally, the relationship between diversification and performance is found to be non linear; 
it’s conditioned by the risk level, hence diversification increase performance only at moderate levels 
of risk. Moreover, this diversification performance’s effect is not uniform among banks or across 
business lines. Our findings suggest that very large, well-capitalized and more efficient banks 
perform better than the other or the specialized ones; traditional forms of intermediation are less 
profitable for them. Also for certain categories of banks, particularly highly specialized ones, some 
activities diversification seems particularly benefic to improve return and to lower the concentration 
risk. In addition, banks can boost performance by choosing the appropriate non-banking activities 
for diversification. In this way, insurance activities may provide a beneficial area in which different 
banks can engage. 
An implication of this analysis is that bank diversification into non-traditional activities should 
be not hazardous. Banking institutions can reap diversification benefits as long as they well-studied 
it and know just how much diversification would be necessary to achieve positive result by 
considering its specific characteristics, capabilities and the risk level, and as they choose the right 
niche. 
  
                                                          
6
 Additional tests are not reported because providing similar results. 
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Appendix 
Table1. Overview of countries surveyed 
Country Number of banks over the sample period Number of listed banks  
Latin-America 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
 
East-Asia 
Indonesia 
Hong Kong 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
 
85 
141 
23 
29 
24 
42 
44 
 
 
49 
72 
34 
64 
37 
33 
37 
 
5 
18 
7 
2 
0 
3 
5 
 
 
22 
12 
20 
16 
13 
9 
26 
Total (14) 714 158 
 
Table2. Overview of bank categories  
 Criteria of classification Number  
Categories of bank size 
 Very large banks Total assets > 10 Billion USD 133 
 Large banks Total assets comprised between 1 and 10 Billion 267 
 Small banks TA comprised between 100 Million and 1 Billion USD 234 
 Very small banks Total assets < 100 Million USD 81 
Categories of bank type 
 Commercial banks Commercial banks; Bank holdings and holding 
companies 
521 
 Investment banks  Investment banks and securities houses 86 
 Non-banking credit institutions Non-bank credit inst. ; Specialized government credit 
inst.; Micro-financing inst. 
75 
 Other banks Saving banks; Cooperative banks; Real estate and 
mortgage banks; Islamic banks; Medium and long term 
credit banks; Multilateral government banks 
33 
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Fig1A. Non-interest income share by categories of bank size 
 
 
Fig1B. Non-interest income share by categories of bank type 
 
 
Fig2. Distribution of revenue diversification 
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